

## Externalities

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## External Effects

- Effects on others not part of a transaction
  - pollution
  - + education
  - + gardens
  - noise

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
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## Social Benefit, Cost



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
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
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### Quotas

- Fix quantity at the efficient level
- Tradable permits yields efficient use
- Used in SO<sub>2</sub>, other pollution
  - Permits bought by environmentalists occasionally

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
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### Extinction

- Stock  $S$  of fish  $\dot{S} = rS(1-S)$ .




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### Add Fishing

- Cost  $b$  to operate a fishing boat
- Catches proportion  $a$  of fish ( $Q=naS$ )
- Constant elasticity of demand  $\varepsilon$
- Competitive (zero profits) fishers,  $n$  boats

$$b = \left(\frac{Q}{n}\right)p(Q)$$

$$Q = \left(\frac{aS}{b}\right)^\varepsilon \quad n = \frac{a^{\varepsilon-1}}{b^\varepsilon} S^{\varepsilon-1}$$

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### Population Dynamics

$$\dot{S} = rS(1-S) - \left(\frac{aS}{b}\right)^\varepsilon$$

- If demand elastic,  $S \approx 0 \Rightarrow \dot{S} \approx rS > 0$
- No extinction
- If demand inelastic, extinction possible
- Necessary if boats sufficiently cheap

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## Extinction

- With inelastic demand, fishing effort rises as stock of fish fall
- If rises fast enough, will drive fish to extinction
- Problem is externality
  - Fishers share common resource pool
  - Market doesn't account for the effect of their catch on the future profitability of fishing

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## Public Goods

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## Public Goods

- Two Key features:
- Non-excludability
- Non-rivalry
- Examples
  - Fireworks
  - National defense
  - ~ Rural highways
  - ~ Parks

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## Free-Riders

- Park size  $S$  (measured in \$)
- Individual value  $v_i(S)$
- Individual contributions stop if  $v_i'(S) \leq 1$
- With voluntary contributions, park is sized so that  $\max v_i'(S) = 1$
- Efficient size satisfies

$$\sum_i v_i'(S) = 1$$

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## Taxes

- Solve inefficient size by setting park size and charging people  $1/n$  of the cost
- Individuals get  $v_i(S) - S/n$
- Under voting, median dominates
- Park is sized at *Median*  $v_i'(S) = 1/n$
- Closer to optimal

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## Local Public Goods

- Local public good is “locally non-excludable”
- Localities differentiate, and public moves to optimal neighborhood
- Makes public goods provision much more efficient
- Especially relevant for schools

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